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by 
G..D. GWYER 
East Africa relies heavily on the export of agricultural 
commodities for foreign exchange. Three of East Africa's most 
important agricultural exports have been subject to quotas under 
international commodity agreements: the International Coffee 
Agreement, the informal sisal agreement, and the informal tea 
agreement. This, paper focuses on a hitherto neglected aspect of 
their wordings: the distribution of gains, from' "membership, among 
exporting..'countries./ ' In.'"reviewing. the major developments under 
each agreement, the value of commodity agreements to East African 
countries is questioned. Particular attention is given to the 
determination of export shares, which are shown to be difficult 
to change once allocated. The need to take account of employment 
effects as well as possible income gains in calculating costs/ 
benefits of membership of commodity agreements is emphasised. 
! 
INTRODUCTION 
tr ; pressures for international commodity agreements that seek 
by means of export restriction'schemes to raise the aggregate export 
earnings' of producing countries are increasing. Such pressures reflect 
(a) the Willingness' of consumer countries to make income transfers to 
poorer countries through this politically acceptable medium, (b) the 
wish of some producing countries to protect their export crop''-jjl ;.t 
industries from unwanted competition from new producers, and (c) the 
desire of international - civil servants to promote development from 
developed country bases. 
The purpose of the present paper .is to strike a discordant 
note in this otheni/ise agreeable congruence of- interests by focusing 
attention on the.distribution of gains from.international commodity 
agreements among producing countries, with particular attention to the 
relative shares of:the gains that the three East African countries hav& 
obtained or are likely to obtain from the agreements that affect three 
of their principal-export crops: coffee, sisal arid tea-, A major 
objective is to draw the lessons of experience from.membership of. the . 
coffee and sisal agreements .for East Africa,, so that a strong stand may-
be made in negotiations with countries- pressing for a -formal tea 
agreement, A subsidiary objective.is to: consider the effects of the •'•?!" 
agreements on rural employment in the East African context., -•'"•-•'-' 
The three agreements.in question are the International 
Coffee Agreement, (ICA) now in its second five year term, the informal 
sisal agreement (ISA) under the;:auspiees of the Consultative "Sub-Commitee 
of the F.A.O. Study Group on Hard Fibres which came into effect.in 
January 1968, and the informal-;tea agreement (iTA) under/the F.A.O. 
Consultative Committee on Tea,- which has been•in. operation just over a 
year. While the language, used to phrase, the. stated objectives of each 
of these agreements-differs, the implied objectives anxtmrcans-of achieving 
them are .the same: namely, to increase export earnings by getting 
producing countries to act together quasi-monopolistically in restricting 
supply against an inelastic-demand. . Thus the 1968 ICA under Article I 
has the stated objectives of eliminating fluctuations in coffee prices 
and increasing the purchasing power of. coffee, exports through higher and 
equitable prices, while the Study Group on Hard Fibres at a Producers* 
meeting in July 1967 noted the possibility of developing market sharing 
arrangements through control of output in major producing countries in 
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order.to .give,the world^ sisal and henequen market, greater, degrees of stability 
and viability, and the UNCTAD Secretariat,.,in .a memorandum prepared for the 
Third AD HOC Consultation oq-Tea., writes of. stemming .the decline, in-the 
general level, of prices, in. order to.:.improye the long-term rate of growth of 
earnings..-from tea,exports, . ...,., .. .... . 
AGREEMENT GAINS AND THEIR DISTRIBUTION' 
Fornally, the present value of a restrictive export agreement 
to an individual producing country is the discounted value of the future 
differences in earnings as a result of the agreement plus the discounted 
value-1 of the resources released"from the export crop in question plus 
whatever benefits-are expected to"accrue from having:greater stablity of 
export earnings, a- factor considered to be of'importance to a. developing 
economy-open to external trade disturbances.- Expressing the problem in 
this "way highlights 'some '"estimation, considerations additional to that of 
predicting prices" and "quantities exported in the,with and without 
agreement situations. Our concern here, however, is not so much with these 
longer run effects, nor with .'the difficult task of estimating prices in 
without agreement situationsf but to consider-ho'w the gains from the ICA and 
the ISA have been, distributed between East Africa and the rest'of the 
world, and the implications for East Africa's collective policy: stand 
vis-a-vis a formal tea.agreement, 
A major contention of this paper is that the distribution 
of gains from restrictive export agreeements tends to benefit the larger 
producing countries because Of their, considerable voting power in the 
decision-making forums, Ab initio large and srrfall producing countries 
have unequal strength's in determining whether an agreement should 
continue or indeed begin.: For large producing countries the choice is 
between an"agreement and no. agreement, since their exclusion from an ' 
agreement^would make it inoperable. For small countries'the'choice is 
membership of the agreement or non-membership, -since their membership may 
not be "essential for the continuation" of the-agreement. Thus large ',' 
producing countries can force, an agreement upon small countries, Who, 
if they had. the choice would prefer no agreement, but are presented with 
a membershipy: nO'h^membership: •alternative."1 In practice there may be no 
alt'ernative to membership - ^ ihce1 if all consuming countries are party to 
the agreement there arc no alterriative markets,' '" •...-.•.; 
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Disparities in bargaining power raise- the possibility Df a 
large producing country initiating an agreement,and disbanding it 
again to suit its own convenience. For example, during the period 
of the present International Coffee Agreement the Brazilian coffee 
industry is being subject to substantial locational changes away from 
frost prone zones to more equable, areas. It could be argued that 
Brazil is-using the agreement to preserve her relative market share 
while improving.:her long term competitive position. Under free market 
conditions the potential long term advantages of this production shift 
might be jeopardised by shortfalls in exportable supplies with consuming 
countries making, good their needs with coffee of another type. Shifts 
in consumer taste are difficult to reverse. 
It is significant that Ceylon, the world's largest 
exporter of tea, is currently pressing hard for an International Tea 
Agreement while embarking on an extensive replacement of old tea stands,, 
while at the. beginning of the informal sisal agreement in 1968, Tanzania, 
the world1s largest exporter of sisal, was starting a rationalization 
programme, for its.recently nationalized estates under the Tanzania 
Sisal Cto^o^ation. 
Thus one precondition for the setting up of a. commodity 
agreement seems to be a vested interest by the largest exporter of the 
commodity for a period of reduced competition, where market shares are 
determined on. the basis of. past export performance rather than curre»t 
exportable supplies. Another precondition seems to be that the price 
of the commodity should have fallen continuously for a period. Given 
that the initiative for the setting up of.international commodity 
agreements rests with producing countries, and that consuming countries 
aquiesce because of aid considerations,'it is interesting to note that 
the International Coffee Agreement, the informal tea agreement and the 
informal sisal agreement came.into being after periods of continuously 
declining prices. 
EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE UNDER THE COFFEE AGREEMENT 
The distribution of gains from the ICA relate directly to the 
initial allocation of quota shares, which in common.with the ISA were 
determined on the basis of. past export performance. This method 
automatically favours large producer countries with established mature 
a ~ 
industries.,-as /opposeci'.'rtQ countries., whose industries are immature and 
just embarking, on-a rapid growth phase. The years- chosen to calculate 
basic export quotas for the 1563 ICA were 19.59/60, 1960/1 and 1961/2 
for an agreement that- began in 1963, .That the choice of this method 
for the determination of quota shares favoured established producer 
countries.may be illustrated from the. varying experiences of the' three 
East Afripan countries under the ICA. -None of these countries' 
industries has reached.-the stage of maturity but their different stages 
of development serve to make the-point at issue. Table 1 shows the 
production growth.rates for-the period before the agreement and during' 
the agreement, together with absolute-.annual increases in exports for' 
the before and during situations.v. 
:It may be observed that for Uganda and Kenya, production 
growth was higher before the agreement than during it, but for Tanzania: 
the beginning of the•agreement marked the start of a period of increased 
production growth,• To simplify, in 1963 Uganda and Kenya had relatively 
mature industries in comparison :to Tanzania. A consequence for Tanzania 
was. a small .export quota -relative to her production so that a high 
proportion of her exports had to be shipped to the lower price non-quota 
markets."'' . . v • . -y 
-The effects on unit export vei.Lies'may be seen by comparison 
of Figures 1, 2 and 3. While it appears that" for all three countries 
the rjte of Recline in export prices"that occurred in the seven years 
prior to..1963 was arrested,.the effects of the agreement on individual 
countries'. average-export, prices-in- the. period 1963 to 1969 vary from 
an annual increase of :£3.--psr; tori for Uganda, to no apparent effect for 
Kenya,, to an annual: decline of nearly £6' per 'ton for Tanzania. No 
information on the-grade composition of output over this period, was 
available to check on the extent.to which changes in average export 
values reflected quality changes,, but it is assumed these were small 
1, The ICA acts as Va:,-dig-fcrimihafeingr.kQDQpfoiist .in-that-it• 
recognises an 'Annex B' list of countries as having low per caput 
coffee consumption, and permits exports to thesM markets free of quota 
restrictions. The Annex B list , actsas a .safety'yalve-to some, extent 
in relieving pressure'for reallocation of quotas, but some of the 
Annex'B countries-have been party to the so-called coffee tourist 
trade, and the list of countries is. becoming..steadily shorter.. 
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in relation to the non-quota market effects, 
Thus far the argument concerning the distribution of gains 
has been limited to within East Africa comparisons. The argument may 
be extended,, however, by considering East Africa's effective quota 
share in comparison with the largest producing country, Brazil. Table 
3 shows these shares oyer the period 1964/5 to 1970/1 together with 
shares of world production. 
While production fluctuations in the case of Brazil are 
of sufficient magnitude to indicate caution in speaking in terms of 
trends, it may be. noted that"while East Africa's share :of world' 
production increased over the period 1964/65 to 1970/71 by three 
percentage points, her sharerof quota exports increased by less than 
one percentage point: this despite significant increases in basic, 
export quotas for the three countries at the start of the 1968 
Agreement (see ,Table 4), Conversely, Brazil whose production share 
fluctuated from 30.82°/- in 1964/5 to 19.28$ in 1970/1, suffered only T,••• •• 
a one percentage point reduction in export quota share. Such a-
finding tends to support the hypothesis that the distribution of 
gains from commodity agreements favours the large producers. 
1 In the period of the 1963 Coffee Agreement, it is reasonable 
to assume that the effects of the agreement from the individual country 
viewpoint were limited to export prices, because of the possibility, of 
selling to non-quota markets should production exceed the country's 
export quota. In the 1968 Agreement, however, not only have non-quota 
markets been reduced and the regulations governing shipments to Annex 
B countries been tightened, but measures have, been introduced that will 
have the effect of restricting the growth of productive capacity of 
all countries, Thus comparison of the costs and benefits of the 
agreement for the individual country becomes as much a matter of 
estimating what production in the without agreement situation would 
be as the without agreement level of prices. Under Resolution 206 of 
the International Coffee Council each country was assigned.a production 
goal.for 1972/3 based upon an estimated annual, increase in world demand 
of 2.5^ applied to each country's new basic export quota, with the 
requirement that each country should prepare a national coffee policy 
plan, showing, how ..it proposed to bring production in line with this goal 
with the aid, if need be, of the ICA's Diversification Fund arising from 
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levies on producing countries' quota exports. 
-p.'?'.•; ;-'.ItVris;-ai? 'some intersst:'to 'compare these production goals 
for tbe '^ st;-/African countries" With their own estimates of production 
potential,,., (see.-.Table 5), 
• f%r Tanzania and Uganda it is clear that substantial 
adjustment problems, as defined by the International Coffee- Organize-".;.-
tion, exist, and either drastic measures such as tree uprooting will 
take place^stocks; will accumulate or the rules and regulations of the 
ICA will'be -infringed. The lesson of experience therefore is that the 
initial allocation of export'-'quotas is crucial. Small producing countries 
with rising production trends should endeavour to secure, right from 
the start, recognition of their'special position in terms of a .quota 
share proportional to their expected production at the end of the 
agreement, 
EAST AFRICAN EXPERIENCE UNDER THE SISAL AGREEMENT -
The important difference from East Africa's viewpoint 
between the Coffee, and Sisal Agreements- is that in the former, East 
Agrica has a relatively small share of the world.'-market (with or without 
the agreement) while in the latter, East Africa, (and. Tanzania ,-in 
particular) has"the "largest share of the market. This .being the case, 
one might expect from the foregoing.discussion of Brazil's influence 
over events in the coffee agreement, that East Africa would have been 
able to exert similar influence over the informal sisal .• agreement to 
its own advantage. Unfortunately this does not seem to have happened as 
we now discuss, . ... .. . -..-., •'••- , 
In 196? the. F.A.,0,. Study Group on. Hard Fibres established 
a Consultative Sub-Committee ...whose-function was to:set up an informal 
commodity agreement pf the. export.: restriction type. The 'modus operandi 
of such an arrangement .was. putlined as follows:,/ • •' r.-.-•••••'•-'. 
•'••• "On the'basis of figures of import requirements to be . v-
. provided by individuals or groups of- imnortingrcountries for 
:'a given period ahead and within, an .'export:, price., range to be 
informally agres'd-rwith the importing countries as representing 
a viable .and acceptable-level .for both'1 sides: of the industry, 
the exporting' countries would agree, again,.informally, on a , --.>;-•, ',; 
system of quotas calculated tc meet the' full level of 
requirements stated: by,.the.Importing' countries. " 
As the careful phrasing of the foregoing statement suggests, 
the producing countries were at pains to assure consumers that there 
would be no 'shortage' of supplies. But the consuming countries them-
selves made sure of this by submitting a generous estimate of their 
requirements for 1968 which the, producing countries accepted as their 
global export .quota,.for that year. It .was hardly surprising that at 
the June 1968 meeting of .the Sub-Committee it was observed that the 
export quota.had had no apparent effect; on the level of prices. 
Instead of reducing the quota: it was., decided to implement a" system of 
minimum prices which would increase in steps to . target let/els by 
August 1969. A price differential of €5 per ton was.agreed between 
Brazilian and East African sisal. ........ 
This meeting in a sense was.the high point of the 
agreement from the producers' viewpoint, and gave rise ..to a spate of 
buying activity which continued through August, However a lot of the 
impetus that had been gained-in'June appears to have been dissipated 
at the November 19.68 meeting and thereafter was not recovered,: 
First, ..the"•producing countries announced a provisional quota for. 1969 
of the same size as for 1963, In. view of the declining-'size of„the 
hard fibre market, and evidence already accumulating/that the 1.968 
quota was itself too large to have any., effect on prices, this state-
ment was an unnecessarily e&rly indication to'buyers.that" there would 
be no problem.in getting supplies .in 1969. Secondly, the new minimum 
price for E.A.R. was., set. equal!, to the then current price of £75 per 
long ton, and the:ratchet, mechanism; agreed at the June meeting was-
quietly forgotten .although, prices were, still well, belpiv .both 'the'' . 
consumers' and producers' indicative ranges,. . Thirdly, in-doing away 
with the. ratchet mechanism the differential between Brazil-and East 
African prices was also dropped. This meant in effect that there was' 
a minimum price for East African, but none for-Brazil. ' -• --.'" -
The results of this were soon apparent, ' With East Africa 
holding a price-umbrella, Brazilian saleS were reported.as surging 
ahead While'the demand for East African remained-quiet. This state 
of affairs continued through until the fourth meeting of'the : 
Consultative Sub-Committee in April, 1969. At this meeting the 
differential for Brazilian was reinstated at £66 per metric ton for 
Brazil No. 3 in relation to an East African.Rejects minimum price of 
£72 per metric ton. An attempt to put teeth back into the agreement 
was made by cutting the global quota and national export quotas by 9.2% 
The effect of this On East African sales was only transitory, however. 
It seems likely that many buyers.had already covered themselves for 
1969 from buying cheap Brazilian, and so the activity reported in the 
market in April failed to carry through to May. For the next nine 
months market reports indicate that sales of East African remained 
at a very low level , 
At the fifth meoting of the Consultative Sub-Committee in 
September"i969 no new developments were recorded apart from an 
expression of determination to take action at the next meeting if prices 
had not moved closer to the indicative range. The minimum prices 
agreed at the previous session were to continue and the global quota 
for 1970 was provisionally set at the same level as for 1969. 
The sixth meeting in January 1970 was unusual in that 
the report of its deliberations simply records a joint statement by . 
Brazil and Tanzania, which the "other producing countries supported". 
The joint statement reads: 
"At a private meeting: between the delegation of Brazil 
and Tanzania general agreement was. reached concerning the two 
main problems of sisal production, i.e., the demand for sisal 
and. quotas resulting from this estimate and the possibility of 
reaching the level'of indicative prices as laid down in the; 
informal agreement. To maintain'the' system of minimum prices 
with a view to raise them insofar as the' market will allow, 
it was agreed that on no account should prices be lowered, 
(sic) Both countries have agreed to strengthen their'efforts 
to control trading outside the terms of the agreement. It 
was also agreed'that joint consultations under the auspices of 
the Consultative Sub-Committee should, continue". 
Shortly after this meeting prices of East African Rejects 
dropped from,their agreed minimum level of-£72 per metric ton to £60. 
Subsequently, in spite"of frequent meetings, there has been no agree-
ment among producing countries, to implement either an export quota 
system "or a system of minimum prices. "Instead there are face-saving 
reports like the one that followed the June 1970 meeting: 
'The producing and consuming countries represented at the 
session decided that they wnuld endeavour to improve the present 
situation of the sisal and henequen market by attempting to raise 
current'market prices between now and the eighth session in early 
October, and by resisting pressures to buy and/or sell belgw these 
levels. At the next session, the overall situation with regard to 
basic quotas for 1971 and minimum and indicative prices would be 
re-examined," 
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The foregoing account of matters decided at successive 
meetings of the Consultative Sub-Committee of the Study Group on Hard 
Fibres is given in some detail as it provides an illustration of how 
one country can secure an advantage over others by astuteness at the 
conference table, even though it does not have disproportionate voting 
power. Hence there is a need for careful preparation of briefs for 
country representatives, and the sending of strong and experienced 
delegations to such forums, ' 
The need for astuteness at the conference table, and 
willingness to practise brinkmanship If necessary, may be further 
exemplified by consideration of the way in which basic quotas were 
determined at the start of the informal sisal agreement. It will 
be recalled from the earlier discussion that East African countries 
in. the Coffee Agreement were disadvantaged in determination of basic 
export quotas by having immature industries with rising production 
trends relative to those of established producers like Brazil. For 
the Informal sisal agreement the roles were reversed, in that Tanzania 
and Kenya have mature industries relative to Brazil. Thus it-was in 
East Africa's interests to have export performance measured over 
a long period to increase their share of the global quota. However 
basic export quotas were agreed for each producer country calculated 
on the higher of the figures of their average export performance in 
two periods., either 1962-66 or 1960-66,- Table 6 shows that the choice 
of the two periods was clearly to the advantage of Brazil, as they, with 
a rising production trend, chose the period 1964—66, The differences 
may not appear great, but in. money terms the failure of East Africa 
to insist upon 1962-^ -66 as the base for calculating quota shares meant 
a 'loss',to East Africa of-€210,000.each year and a gain to Brazil of 
£245,000, assuming a price at f.o.b. of £70 per metric ton. 
There are two other points from the experience of the 
sisal agreement worthy of note, both "of which derive from the informal 
nature of the: agreement. A cynic might'say ..an relation to ..informal 
agreements that "a participating country needs to give the appearance 
of conforming to resolutions adopted,at' meetings regarding minimum 
prices and maximum export quantities, but that because It is an informal 
agreement, nobody can,do much about it if you do not. in this context 
we may question first, Tanzania's ovorzealous curtailment of production 
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in 1968 to ensure that the export quota was not exceeded, and.second, 
East Africa's export quota fulfillment in 1968, and especially 1969, 
at a time when other"countries were exceeding their quotas,, (sec 
Table 7). - • ' " 
The level of production in Tanzania in 1968 shows a 
considerable drop from the level of the previous year, and this may 
be attributed largely to the method by which Tanzania restrained 
exports to comply with the nationaliquota. The reduction in production 
was achieved by giving each estate a sales quota, calculated on the 
basis of estimated production for 1968 and average production in the 
previous three years. From estates' returns we have an idea of.what 
production would have been in 1968 in the absence of the agreement, 
for in The Tanganyika Sisal Growers' Association Report for 1967/8, 
the Chairman states: -. 
"When returned these forms revealed that'estates antici-" 
pated a total' production..in 1968 of around 240,000 metric tons. 
It was clear that there had been some overestimates and a 
searching re-examination was carried out by the sub-committee 
of the information provided by all members.in conjunction with 
planting returns submitted previously. As a result some 
arbitrary pruning was possible, and the final total basic 
quota was eventually brought down to 228,000 metric tons. 
A uniform reduction of 12.02% in everybody's basic quota was 
necessary in order to bring the total down to no"more than 
205,000 tons (the amount of the national quota)",. 
Thus when we note from Table 7 that Tanzania only shipped 
97.5$ of her quota in 1968, it was not.because there was not enough 
sisal leaf, but because of an overly restrictive internal quota system. 
An additional reason was that Tanzania was finding it difficult to sell 
from stocks at the minimum price level agreed in November, while Brazil 
was free to sell at any price, which being a traditionally weak seller 
she' did. Thus the February 1969 edition of Wigglesworth's Monthly 
Fibre Report notes in relation to East African sales that: . 
"Competition from Brazilian sisal selling at persistently 
low prices has caused further decline, A paradoxical situation 
arises through the retention of a minimum price for East African 
.UG of £72, arbitrarily agreed upon at the last F.A.O. Hard Fibre 
Conference in November, Since no minimum prices were fixed for 
other grades and none was agreed for Brazilian sisal, the effect 
now is that East African UG is not...competitive with. Brazilian. 
An upward adjustment of Brazilian prices, whether by application 
of an obligatory minimum 'or otherwise? is Clearly railed for." • 
The-position was rectified at the-April, 1969 meeting' of 
the Consultative Sub-Committee with a minimum price of £66 per metric 
ton for Brazil No.3, butthe decision at"the same meeting to reduce 
national quotas by 9.2°'-, which was observed by East Africa, was not 
observed by .other countries (Table 7.) ,. ... In the .light of this, it is 
perhaps not surprising that attempts to .reactivate the agreement which 
collapsed, in .early 1970 have not been successful. To summarize, the •-
following appear to be the principal lessons of experience East Africa 
should draw from the coffee, and sisal..agreements: . ^ '• » 
1. careful preparation of briefs' and strong delegations for ' " ' 
the decisionmaking- and bargainihg"" forums. 
2. f-"wariness of informal agreements that cannot' be policed -y 
by an independent authority. 
3. mustering all possible support and bargaining skill for 
preliminary sessions when basic export quotas are 
' '" negotiated. 
4. consideration of long—term objectives-, when it comes to 
restraining domestic, production. 
There are indications -from what may be discerned of East 
Africa's approach to-the informal tea agreement that the sister 
countries' attitudes have been conditioned by past unfavourable 
experience of commodity agreements. However it-seems that Tanzania's 
reaction, for example, may not be in her long term interests, as we now 
discuss, 
EAST AFRICA AND THE TEA' AGREEMENT , "r'-
The position of East African countries within the informal 
tea agreement is.similar to their position within the International 
Coffee Agreement, in that they are small producers with industries that 
are still immature', in the sense that the potential exists both in terms 
of land and climate for considerable expansion. Thus a crucial issue 
is the size of their basic export quotas in relation to their production 
and export potential over time. 
That some of the difficulties facing small producing 
countries were recognised by the UNCTAD Secretariat is shown by their 
memorandum prepared for the Third Ad. Hoc. Consultation on Tea in. which 
they discuss various methods for quota allocation, including a method 
that would take heed of a country's potential production during the 
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life of an agreement. The basis on which quotas were determined for 
the informal arrangements among producers for 1970 has not been made 
explicit however. -
Table Q shows for each East African country its 1970 tea 
quota in relation to 1969 exports and production, and F.A.O. 
estimates of 1975 production. Also shown are production targets for 
each country according to its latest development plan. 
Table 9 illustrates how estimates of each country's 
exportable supplies in 1975 may be estimated using the information in 
Table 8. Apparent consumption for 1969 is the difference between 
exports and production in that year. Predicted consumption for 1975 
is obtained.by applying a 3.5°/f annual growth rate to 1969 apparent 
consumption, the" growth rate^assumed by F.A.O,, in forecasting 
consumption of tea in developing countries over this period. 
Exportable supplies in 1975 is then the difference.between (estimated 
1975 production and estimated consumption, .For Kenya and Uganda the 
F.A.O. estimate of 1975 production is taken, for Tanzania this esti-
mate is.regarded as being too conservative and the Plan figure is taken 
instead. 
Comparing the estimates of 1975 exportable supplies for the 
three East African countries with an estimate of world exports of tea 
in 1975 of 1,500 mn lbs, derived from F.A.O, figures, Table 10 shows 
needed quota shares for 1975 compared with actual quota shares in 1970, 
It may be noted that Tanzania and Kenya need larger quota shares if 
they are not to accumulate stocks while Uganda's present quota: share 
seems adequate to her needs, . 
The experience of. the Coffee Agreement suggests that once. 
quota shares are established they are exceedingly difficult to change, 
Tanzania was only able after a long fight to get an increased share 
in 1968/9, which was still insufficient to meet her production 
potential. The basis on which the quota shares were established for 
the informal tea agreement in 1970 is not made clear in the reports 
of the meetings. A cursory glance at the figures reveals, however that 
they are npt based, as were the quotas of the coffee and.sisal 
agreements, on a strict index of past export performance, but take some 
account of export potential. The extent to which export potential.is 
taken into account, however, seems to vary from country to. country, 
13 -
suggesting.that hard bargaining behind the scenes was an important 
determinant of quotas. Thus it appears significant that Uganda with 
an estimated production according to its own development plan of 46.31 
mn lbs. in 1971 was given an export quota of 54.1 mn lbs. for 1970. 
Uganda, prigr to the Mauritius meeting of tea exporting countries in 
August 1969, was recognised by the established producers as being 
likely to firmly oppose an export.restrictive agreement in view of her 
smallholder tea development plans, and may therefore have been 
persuaded of the merits of such a scheme by such a large initial quota. 
Kenya too was able to secure an increase in quota of 5 mn lbs, 
between August and December 1959, presumably as a result of behind 
the scences bargaining. 
Tanzania, has similar plans to Uganda for expansion-.of 
smallholder tea area, but is behind Uganda and Kenya in implementation. 
Tanzania on the other hand did not attend the Mauritius meeting and 
was allocated in her absence a 1970 quota of only 14,6 million lbs, 
compared with her actual exports in 1969 of 16.7 mn lbs. It is 
perhaps not surprising that Tanzania at the December 1969 Rome meeting 
of the Consultative Committee recorded her inability to participate 
in the exporters' agreement for 1970, despite a promised increase in 
her quota of 2.5 mn lbs., but at the same time one may question whether 
Tanzania's ostrich like behavior will redound to her own best interests. 
For what will happen to Tanzania's share of world markets if a legally-
binding formal agreement does come into being which closes markets to 
non-members? 
A further question that arises is the apparent lack.of 
cooperation among East African countries (with their common interests 
in tea as strong as any other) when a united front at the bargaining 
table (as Ceylon and-.India have done) would likely have secured a larger 
aggregate quota. Perhaps the major exporting countries saw this danger, 
and 'bought off' Uganda with the large quota we have already noted. 
COMMODITY.AGREEMENTS AND EMPLOYMENT 
Rural unemployment and underemployment are described in 
Kenya's Development Plan" 1970-74 as "Kenya*s-most difficult and 
persistent problems". Elimination of rural underemployment is also 
of major policy concern in Tanzania and Uganda. It is worthy of note ' 
therefore that the three countries are involved in restrictive export 
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given industry structure that demand for labour will increase 
pari passu with output, and output will be less under a restrictive 
export agreement .for low cost producers than without it. Second, 
the level of prices which will be lower in the without agreement 
situation may influence the structure of cduction. Thus 5 
MacFarquhar has distinguished labours-intensive and capital-, 
intensive methods of production in the Kenya coffee industry, 
and it can be argued that in a low coffee price without-agreement 
situation the long term equilibrium production situation in Kenya 
would be one dominated by low cost, labour intensive, small scale 
producers. For sisal and tea only the first of these considerations 
probably applies, but Lawrence has recently argued in favour of. 
transforming the traditional estate structure of sisal production 
in Tanzania .into mere labour intensive ujarnaa villages. 
It is not easy to quantify the extent of the reduced 
employment opportunities because this, entails.inter alia the 
estimation of"export.quantities (and prices) in the without 
agreement situations. However, an attempt can be made for coffee 
to set an order of magnitude on the employment effects of the ICA. 
The national coffee policy plans of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda . 
estimated the number of. smallholdings.growing coffee at 250,000, 
300,000 and 535,000 respectively. Additionally in Kenya there are 
some 770 coffee estates, and in.Tanzania about 200 coffee estates. In 
7 
a stratified random sample of 60 coffee,estates in Kenya, Waters 
found an,average employment level of 25,782 man days per estate 
per year, or roughly the equivalent of 100 men employed full time 
assuming an annual rate, of 2.60 days per man, ' A sample of 300 
smallholdings of mature coffee showed an average, labour use of 
313,5 mandays per year. If these figures are representative, the 
coffee industry in East Africa provides the equivalent of on farm 
5. A,- MacFarquhar,-' A Model for Estimating' Increased 
Employment Potential on Small-Scale Farms'in Kenya.- East'Africa 
Agricultural Economics Society Conference,. Dar es Salaam,-.1970, 
s« P.R. Lawrence, The Sisal Industry in Tanzania. Economic' 
Research Bureau Paper IMo.70-13.. University of Dar es Salaam, 1970, 
7,. A, Waters, Th^ Cost Structure' of the'Kgpya' Coffee 
Industry. Ph. D. tbesTs, Rice University, Texas,. 1969, 
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full time employment for about 1,5. million people, Assuming further 
a constant labour/output ratio as production expands, It appears 
that to the extent the three East African countries hold, ~~~ . 
production within the Production Goals of Resolution 206, employment 
for almost half a million people in coffee production will be 
denied if we take the countries1 estimates of their potential 
production given in Table 3 as being realistic. 
The same data source can also be. used to illustrate 
the order of magnitude of the increase in. employment and saving 
in material inputs in Kenya, if coffee, production were to become., 
the sole preserve of smallholders. Table 11 shows, some of the 
important differences in production relationships as between. ...... 
estates and smallholders, which, form the basis of the calculation. 
Taking 1968/9 output'figures1 for'" estates and small-
holders, and assuming that all production was by smallholders, 
there would be a,net increase in labour input of 22.5 mn, .mandays. . 
equivalent to 86,599 jobs, assuming a working year of 260 mandays.. 
Concomitantly there wpuld be a saving, in use of material,inputs 
in the amount of €2 mn, much.of it foreign exchange. . 
CONCLUSION • • ••' 
• This review of East Africa's experience of three 
international commodity agreements suggests strongly that small 
exporting countries are disadvantaged relative to the large exporting 
countries in formal commodity agreements' and the distribution of 
gains from them. It appears also that exporting countries should 
approach Informal commodity agreements with caution, and recognise 
that careful preparation of briefs and strong delegations to the 
decision making forums are likely to be necessary if a country is 
to secure an equitable.share of the gains. In evaluating gains,and 
losses from membership, countries need to take a long term view, as formal 
agreements tend to be self^ostHimTig'ni7i^"T!tTota--shares tied to 
initial export allocatip^ ns.i.-. Tb/date there;.jigs; been'insufficient attention 
given to the employment '-effects- of comrrrodityyagv^  " 
East African countries are likely to be negative. 
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Table 1, Growth in Production and Exports before and during 
the International Coffee Agreement 
annual producation growth 
rates from trend f%) 
average annual increments 
in exports (tons)9 
1950-62 
Kenya 10.2 
Tanzania 4,1 
Uganda 14,3 
1960/1-69/70 
5,1 
10,8 
4,8 
1950-62 1963-69 
1832 (.93) 1536 (.46) 
819 (.89) 4132 (.85) 
8008 (.94) 44D0 (.72) 
figures in parentheses are corrclc.ticn coefficients between time and 
exports. 
Sources: l) East African Statistical Reports. 
2) Report of the"Working Group on Production Goals, 
I CO—E8—756/69. 
3) Tropical Products Quarterly,.Commonwealth Seqretaria, 
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-• -••-••.-.... : 19637FtcT 1963/9 
1963/4 1964/5 . 1965/6 1966/7 1967/8 1968/9 
Kenya ID.9 7.5 7.2 15.4 3.6 6.0 
Tanzania 7.1 19.4 22.4 40.6 34.2 26.7 
Uganda 13.5 17.8 32.8 19.7 18.9 • 21.0 
Sources: Report of the.Working Group on Production Goals, 
ICO-EB—756/69. 
Tropical Products Quarterly, Commonwealth Secretariat. 
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Table——S- -East-Africans.. Shares of World Production.and Quota Exports 
Compared witTi''"Bira2ii-«- •-'---•'-•---
1964/5 1965/6 1966/7 1967/3 1968/9 1969/70 1970/1 
(per o 
7.38 9.23 
East Africa 
production 6.32 5.27 7.63 6.14 8.84 
effective 
quota 
share 
6.06 6.32 7.05 7.23 6.95 7.00 7.01 
actual 
quota 7.10 
share 
Brazil 
production 
share 31.36 
effective 
quota 30.37 
share 
actual 
quota 
share 
31.77 
7.42 7.23 6,90 6.34 
46.75 30.55 34.73 27.92 
37.82 37.18 35.42 38.25 
36.92 37.16 36.38 39.22 
n.a. 
31.89 
37.18 
n.a. 
n.a. 
19.28 
37.25 
n.na. ~ 
production forecasts made by the Tropical Products Quarterly, 
September 1970. 
Sources: Tropical Products Quarterly, March 1968, March 19®, 
September and December 1970. 
* 
Basic export quotas are decided at the beginning of the agreement and 
are not changed during the life of it. Basic export quotas determine each 
country's share of the annual global quota decided upon by the 
International Coffee Council. A country's effective quota is its annual 
quota less any deductions for past overexporting or other misdemeanours. 
A country's total export entitlement is its effective annual quota plus 
any special allowances or special export authorizations permitted because 
of favourable market conditions for its type of coffee. Actual exports 
may differ from total export entitlement if a country experiences a 
shortfall in production, and has no stocks. 
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Table 4 Rasic Export Quotas "under thR~T962 and 1968.Ooffee Agreement, 
1962 
basic export < share basic export 
quota ™ ° t a 
('000-bags) 
'1968 
°/n share i increase 
Kenya 
Uganda 
Tanzania 
Brazil . 
517 
' 1888 
435 
18000 
1 .17 
4,10 
' 0.95. 
39.13 
860 
2379 
700 
20926 
1.56 
4.32 
1.27 
33.02 
56.3 
26.0 
60.9 
16.3 
Source ;e: Tropical Products Quarterly, March 1968. 
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Table 5 IQA»j5y&liuctjfeo- -•gs.a&s^ dn.. relgfcjLprr to Country Estimates of 
........ Eu.tyre -Production . 
Production 
Goals 
1972/3 
..Actual Production 1972/3 Trend 1973/4 
1968/93 Production13 Production 
(thousand bags) Estimate 
Kenya 929 802 1000 1190 
Tanzania 810 950 1100 1200 
Uganda 2676 3470 .3600 
Tropical Products Quarterly, September 1970, 
b , . linear extrapolation of production .1960/1 to 1969/70 
Kenya Development Plan, 1970-1974 
Tanzania Second Five Tear Development Plan, Volume I 
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Table 6 Quotas under the Informal Sisal Ac, 
2 '. . Alterqative Past &gS£^JFei?o'rmancel Bases*" 
Actual Quota 1968 Alternative Quota -- • • f •. >• •.:- . 
('ODD: metric tons) -
Tanzania 205.7 208.0 
Kenya 56.8 57.5 
Brazil 142.6 139.1 
Actual quotas were determined.by.giving each country a choice of two 
periods"to calculate their past export performance: 1962-1966 or 
1964-66. Ihe figures shown under the Alternative Quota head are 
those that would have pertained if 1962-66 had been, the period for 
calculation for all countries. 
Sources: Study GroUp on"Hard Fibres; COP: HF/SC 69/Statistics No.l, 
dune 1969, F.A.O. Rome. 
Proceedings of the Second Session of the F.A.O, Study 
Group on Hard Fibres held in Rome in September 1967, as 
reported in the Kenya Sisal Board Bulletin, November 1967. 
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Table 7 Production and Exports of Sisal; Kenya and Tanzania 
Compared with Brazil* 1966-71 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971a 
('000 metrict tons) 
Tanzania 
b 
exports 211.9 220.1 - 2 0 0 . 6 185.0 230.5 
(97.5)- " (100.0) 
production 225.1 220.1 . 196.9 209.3 202.0 195.0 
Kenya 
exports -57.4 43.1 45.0 - 38.5 •; 46.7 
(71.3) (77.0) 
production 57.3 51.7 50.2 49.8 45.0 - .50.0 
Brazil 
exports 159.0 135.3 143.4 153.4 161.3 
(100.6)' (118.0) 
w 
production 190.0 185.0 180.0 185.0 180.0 183.5 
a b F.A.0. forecasts: " figures in parentheses.are percentage quota 
fulfillment. ' • - , . . . 
Production includes sisal fibre and tow. Exports are sisal fibre'and 
tow, and sisal cordage manufactures (mainly sisal rope and twine), bui 
exclude flume tow. 
Sources: Study Group on Hard Fibres, Consultative Sub-Committee; Hard 
Fibre Statistics 1966-69, CCP:HF/SC 69/Statistics No.l, F.A.0. 
Rome. East African Trade Reports, 1969 and 1970. 
Kenya Sisal Board Bulletin, March 1971. 
Tea Export Quotas in Relation to Present and Projected 
Production 
1969 1969 1970 Planned F.A.0. Production 
Production3 Exports'3 Quota0 Production Estimate for 
„.,._ 197ER 
million pounds 
Kenya 79.50 72^ .40 76.00' 100,88d(l974) 108.05 
Tanzania 19.35 16.70 17.10. 29.03e (1974) 24*26 
Uganda 38,75 34,90 54,10 42.00f (l97l) 46,31 
Journal of. the Tea Boards of East Africa, January,. 1970. 
b 'vi":-East African Trade Report, 1969, — 
Report Of the First Session of the Consultative Committee 
on Tea, F.A.0,, CCP 70/3, Appendix 5. 
d Kenya Development Plan 1970-74. 
e Tanzania Second Five fear Development Plan, 
.p 
Work for Progress, Uganda's Second Five Tear Plan. 
Third Ac Hot Consultation on Tes," The Longer-Term Outlook for 
Production, F.A.0., CCP: Tah/58/3. • " •• ' ; 
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Table 9 Derivation of Exportable Supplies in 1975 
Apparent Consumption Predicted 
1969 Consumption 
1975 
(million lbs,) 
Kenya 7,10 8,73 99.32 
Tanzania 2.65 3.26 25.77 
Uganda 3.85 4.74 41,57 
•Exportable 
Supplies 1975 
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Table ID Needed Quota Shares 1975 compared with Actual Quota 
Shares 1970 
Actual quota share needed quota 
1970 share 1975 
(percentages) 
Kenya 5.74 6.62 
Tanzania 1.29 1*72 
Uganda 4.08. 2.77 
Table 11 
Comparative Data of Smallholder and Estate Coffee 
production^ (1965/6) 
smallhoider estate 
sample si~e Tin 6n 
average labour 
inp.'.'t per tree 
(mandays) .085 
mean farm corvee 
output(cwt clean) <&a. 
mean no. of trees 
per farm OAF 77490 
mean no. of mandays 
of coffee labour per farm ?32 
yield per tree 
fibs, of clean) 14 1,69 
output per manday 
(lbs clean) 1.44 4.23 
material inputs 
per tree(shs) . 026 1,565 
* A.R. Waters."The Cost Structure of the Kenya Coffee Industry" 
unpublished Ph.D., thesis, Rice University, is the'source of the 
data used in deriving the components of this Table. Waters carried 
out a smallholder cofee survey of 300 farms randomly selected In 
Meru District, and an"estate survey of a stratified random sample of 
60 farms across Kenya. In the smallholder survey, a long pre-tested 
Questionnaire "'as completed by tain fed enumerators, while the estate 
information was collected by waters, largely from estate records. 
1956 1962 1963 i969 
1953 " T962 1963 1569 
r = correlation coefficient between time and unit esport values. 
